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OPINION OF THE COURT
____________________________
BECKER, Circuit Judge.
Jeanette Spear and the Estate of her late husband, Leon
Spear, ("taxpayers") appeal the decision of the United States Tax
Court assessing substantial income tax deficiencies and fraud
penalties

against

them

following

a

five-day

trial.

The

tax

court's decision depends in significant measure on "deemed" facts
resulting from a sanction imposed because of Jeanette Spear's
failure to appear and testify at trial.
critical

to

the

outcome

because

they

These deemed facts were
not

only

furnished the

predicate for use by the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") of the
net worth method to determine income tax liability, but also
appear to have shifted the burden of proof on both net worth and
fraud from the IRS to the taxpayer.
The

tax

court

imposed

this

quite

severe

sanction

notwithstanding that it had before it a five-hour long videotaped
deposition of Jeanette Spear taken for possible use at trial

which

covered

testimony.

all

the

ground

of

reasonably

expected

trial

sanction,

Moreover, the ultimate basis for imposition of the
Jeanette

Spear's

putative

bad

faith

in

failing

to

appear at trial, is based on such a frail foundation that the tax
court's

bad

review.

Given these considerations, and the fact that the other

factors

faith

that

we

finding

consider

does

in

not

survive

applying

the

even

deferential

principles

used

to

assess the validity of sanctions favor the taxpayers, we conclude
that the sanction imposed here was improper and an abuse of
discretion.

We will therefore vacate the tax court's decision

and remand for further proceedings.

I.
A.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Background

During the years in question, taxpayers were the sole
shareholders

in

several

corporations

which

operated

a

large

number of parking lots in Center City Philadelphia on the fringe
of the downtown area.

The IRS contends that taxpayers skimmed

money from these cash businesses and failed to report it as
income.

The IRS based its assessment of deficiencies on the net

worth method, under which it determined income by subtracting
taxpayers' net worth at the end of the tax year from their net
worth

at

the

adjustment
expenditures.

beginning

for

of

nontaxable

the

tax

year

receipts

with

and

appropriate
nondeductible

The IRS often uses this method when the taxpayers'

income and expense records are inadequate or incomplete.

In
taxpayers

1986,

the

assessing

IRS

income

issued
tax

a

Notice

deficiencies

of

Deficiency
of

to

$51,271.70,

$157,706.46 and $93,536.23 for the years 1975, 1976 and 1977
respectively.

The

Notice

also

asserted

fraud

penalties

$25,635.85, $78,853.23 and $46,768.12 for the same years.
33.

of

JA 27-

Taxpayers sought a redetermination of these assessments in

tax court.

On October 31, 1989, Leon Spear suffered a stroke and

died soon thereafter.

The tax court substituted the Estate of

Leon Spear as a defendant.
The taxpayers contended at trial that: 1) the IRS had
inappropriately used the net worth method because they had kept
adequate records of their income; 2) the source of the funds that
led to the large increase in their net worth was $380,000 in cash
that Leon Spear's father had given to him years earlier which had
been kept in safe deposit boxes, so that taxpayers' net worth at
the beginning of the 1975 was far higher than the IRS believed;
and 3) the parking lots could not have produced sufficient income
to account for the increase in net worth the IRS claimed.

The

tax court rejected these contentions and concluded that there
were tax deficiencies of $43,354.65, $155,504.29 and $92,053.20
for 1975, 1976 and 1977.

It also imposed fraud penalties of

$21,677.32, $77,752.14 and $46,026.60 for the same years.
Although taxpayers repeat on appeal their contentions
about the use of the net worth method, and challenge the factual
findings pertaining to net worth as clearly erroneous, they also
strenuously argue that the court committed reversible error by
sanctioning them for Jeanette Spear's failure to testify.

The

sanction was a linchpin of the tax court's decision, and we limit
our

discussion

of

the

record

to

the

facts

bearing

on

the

sanctions issue.

B.

The Facts Leading to the Imposition of Sanctions

In April 1990, the tax court entered an order setting
the

case

for

trial

on

November

9,

1990.

JA

5.

The

IRS

subpoenaed Jeanette to appear at trial because she was the only
living witness to the alleged 1957 gift of $380,000 from Leon's
father, and because she had been responsible for maintaining the
books of the parking corporations.

JA 923-24.

On October 25, 1990, taxpayers moved for a continuance
on the basis that Jeanette was experiencing emotional trauma
based on the anniversary of her husband's death (a death she
attributed to the prosecution by the IRS, JA 11-12) and the
approach

of

the

trial.

On

November

2,

1990,

Dr.

Sol

B.

Barenbaum, a psychologist chosen by the Commissioner, examined
Jeanette and reported that she could testify without mental or
physical harm.
Jeanette

was

Hospital

in

JA 10-13, 124-25.
admitted

to

Philadelphia

the
after

However, on November 5, 1990,
psychiatric
her

unit

attending

of

Nazareth

physician,

Dr.

Martin J. Durkin, was told that she had attempted suicide by gas
and possibly pills.

JA 16, 125.

Taxpayers then moved for a continuance, attaching a
letter from Dr. Durkin, who is a Board-certified psychiatrist,
stating that Jeanette was suffering from "psychotic depression
and a recent serious suicide attempt" and that she needed to be

hospitalized for at least two or three weeks.
court granted the continuance on November 6.

JA 14.

JA 7.

The tax

The next day

Jeanette's son, Robert Spear, requested that she be released from
the hospital.

The hospital allowed her out for the day on

November 9, 10, and 11, and discharged her on November 12.

JA

143-44.
Dr. Durkin evaluated Jeanette again in December 1990,
and January, March and April, 1991.

(JA 15-18).

On March 18,

Dr. Durkin wrote to defense counsel that after three psychiatric
evaluations of Jeanette he had concluded that
[s]he continues to suffer from a depressive
illness with features of anxiety. I do not
feel it wise to expose the patient to a
judicial process in respect to her concerns
with the Federal Government.
This type of
exposure could exacerbate her present illness
and possibly lead to another suicide attempt.
The stress could be a precipitating event to
a possible heart attack or stroke.
J.A. 15.

On April 29, after conducting still another psychiatric

evaluation, Dr. Durkin again wrote to defense counsel.

He stated

that based on his continuing personal evaluation of Jeanette
combined with the evaluation of a neurologist and a recreational
therapist

who

observed

Jeanette

and

conducted

several

during her hospitalization, his
opinion remains that the patient should not
be
exposed
to
depositions
or
to
interrogatories
because of her present
gradual
emotional
status.
To
again
summarize, I believe that any type of
exposure to these types of events would
exacerbate her depression and again cause a
psychiatric hospitalization.
Worse, the

tests

patient may again make an attempt at suicide
which could be successful.
JA 18.
There is no evidence that, after this April evaluation,
Jeanette had any further treatment until the next time the case
was set for trial.

See T.C. Mem. Op. at 23.

In July, 1991, the

Commissioner sought leave to take a videotaped deposition of
Jeanette,

arguing

that

such

a

deposition

was

needed

due

to

Jeanette's possible unavailability for trial as a result of "her
mental, emotional or physical infirmity."

JA 105.

Taxpayers

opposed the application, submitting the April letter from Dr.
Durkin

quoted

above,

in

which

Dr.

Durkin

noted

Jeanette's

obsession with the trial and that she suffered from transitional
stress due to her difficulties with the IRS.

JA 18.

On August 8, 1991, the IRS moved for a court-ordered
physical and mental examination to determine Jeanette's ability
to

testify.

Taxpayers

opposed

the

application,

submitting

another letter from Dr. Durkin stating that a forced examination
or appearance in a court would "be a serious danger to Mrs.
Spear," JA 21, and pointing out that Jeanette had previously
undergone a court ordered examination.

Taxpayers also submitted

an

a

affidavit

from

Dr.

Marvin

Rubin,

psychologist

who

had

treated Jeanette from November 15, 1989 through October 24, 1990,
stating that:
[w]hether correctly or incorrectly Jeanette
attributes the death of her husband to the
fear and anxiety that he had relating to the
Internal Revenue Service hearing.
Jeanette
is
very
anxious
and
upset
about
the

possibility of herself dying at the hearing.
It is my professional opinion that Jeanette
is incapable presently to withstand the
trauma of a court hearing due to her
emotional and psychological state.
Add in
the
fact
that
the
anniversary
of
her
husband's death is imminent, the effect would
psychologically devastating.
J.A.

11-12.
The court denied the motion for a videotaped deposition

but granted the motion for a physical and mental examination.
Taxpayers refused to have Jeanette appear for the examination and
the Commissioner moved for sanctions.

See T.C. Mem. Op. at 24.

Taxpayers then decided that it was preferable for Jeanette to
appear

for

the

examination.

videotaped

JA 165.

deposition

than

the

physical

On November 13, 1991, the court ordered

Jeanette to appear for the videotaped deposition and scheduled
briefing on the sanctions motion.
On December 12, 1991, the IRS deposed Jeanette (on
videotape) for more than five hours.

In taxpayers' submission,

they gave the IRS great leeway in questioning, objecting only
eight times and not asking any follow up questions in order not
to elevate Jeanette's level of stress.

The taxpayers contend

that Jeanette was distressed and confused at times during the
deposition;

the

IRS

asserts

that

she

testify coherently and knowledgeably.
807,

814

conclusion

with

JA

of

the

638-40,

659-63,

deposition,

IRS

showed

that

she

could

Compare JA 650, 764-65,
736-38,
counsel

transcript be marked for use at trial.

750-52.
asked

JA 921.

At

the

that

the

After the

deposition, the court granted the IRS' motion to withdraw its

request for sanctions and denied the IRS' motion for a competency
hearing as moot.

JA 185.

The IRS subpoenaed Jeanette to appear as a witness at
trial.
Jeanette

On February 17, 1992, taxpayers notified IRS counsel that
would

not

appear

at

trial

because

doing

so

would

endanger her health and because the IRS had taken her videotaped
deposition two months earlier.

The Commissioner moved to compel

Jeanette to testify or for sanctions.

On February 20, the tax

court held a hearing at which the Commissioner's counsel offered
to limit Jeanette's testimony to one or two hours and to "hold it
in an atmosphere similar to that of a deposition."
921, 926, 929.

JA 8, 835-36,

Taxpayers did not accept this arrangement, and

the court ordered Jeanette to appear and testify on February 24.
See T.C. Mem. Op. at 25.
Taxpayers

requested

that

the

court

schedule

an

evidentiary hearing on February 25 for Dr. Durkin to testify
about Jeanette's condition and thus to help the court understand
why she could not testify.

JA 837, 920.

The court denied the

request on the grounds that it would disrupt the trial schedule,
see T.C. Mem. Op. at 24, although counsel offered to have Dr.
Durkin testify before Jeanette's scheduled testimony so as not to
disrupt the trial.

JA 930.

The court agreed to accept another

affidavit from Dr. Durkin instead, stating "[i]f it's just a
matter of effectiveness of presentation, oral versus writing,
then I'm not going to have a hearing for that purpose."

JA 932.

On February 23, the day before she was to testify,
Jeanette was again admitted to Nazareth Hospital.

According to

the hospital records, the accuracy of which Dr. Durkin certified
as the attending physician, Jeanette had a "major depressive
affective

disorder,

recurrent

episode,

severe

with

psychotic

behavior" and "unspecified acute reaction to stress."

JA 225.

Dr. Durkin's admission note states that Jeanette cried frequently
during

the

evaluation,

difficulty concentrating.

had

a

hopeless

demeanor,

and

had

JA 232-33. Although her sons reported

that she may have been abusing valium, laboratory tests did not
show the presence of valium or any similar substances in her
system.

JA 217, 232, 234-40, opinion at 26.

Jeanette did not

appear in court on February 24 and the tax court granted the
Commissioner's motion for sanctions.
On

February

25,

the

day

JA 186, 1095.
after

she

was

supposed

to

testify, while the trial was still going on, Jeanette checked out
of the hospital.

The taxpayers did not inform the court that

Jeanette had done so (T.C. Mem. Op. at 26).

C.

The Sanctions Themselves

As a result of Jeanette's failure to testify, the tax
court sanctioned the taxpayers by deeming the Commissioner to
have "made a prima facie showing" of the allegations in paragraph
7 of the Commissioner's answer, those dealing with net worth and
fraud, JA 186, 1095-96 opinion at 33, and to have "met the burden
of going forward as to those allegations.
of

going

forward

with

evidence

to

This shifts the burden
petitioners

to

respondent's allegations of fraud." T.C. Mem. Op. at 33.

rebut

Among the facts the court deemed to be true were that:
(1) taxpayers had furnished only incomplete tax records to the
IRS; (2) the IRS had determined correct taxable income for the
years 1975-77 on the basis of the net worth method; (3) taxpayers
did not have available any cash on hand as of December 31, 1974
which

was

not

deposited

in

one

of

their

bank

accounts;

(4)

taxpayers used unreported income to acquire eight real estate
properties in their names or the name of a wholly owned nominee
corporation used to conceal their real estate holdings, and also
used unreported income for other expenditures; and (5) taxpayers
understated

their

taxable

income

for

the

years

1975-77

case,

the

Commissioner

with

fraudulent intent.
In

a

net

worth

must:

(1)

establish with reasonable certainty an opening net worth; and (2)
either (a) show a likely income source, or (b) negate possible
nontaxable income sources.

Holland v. United States, 348 U.S.

132-38 (1954), T.C. Mem. Op. at 36.

By deeming the IRS to have

established correct taxable income on the basis of the net worth
method, the tax court appears to have shifted the burden of proof
on this central aspect of the case.

T.C. Mem. Op. at 33 (holding

for the IRS generally, the court stated that "[p]etitioners did
not provide sufficient evidence to overcome these deemed facts").
That the imposition of sanctions may well have been
critically

important

to

the

result

is

especially

clear

considering the fraud counts. The tax court did state that:
Respondent has the burden of proving fraud by
clear and convincing evidence. Sec. 7454(a);
Rule 142(b).
First, respondent must prove

when

the existence of an underpayment.
Parks v.
Commissioner, 94 T.C. 654, 660 (1990).
Respondent may not rely upon the taxpayer's
failure to carry the burden of proof as to
the
underlying
deficiency.
Parks
v.
Commissioner, supra at 660-661; Petzholdt v.
Commissioner, 92 T.C. 661, 700 (1989); Estate
of Beck v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 297, 363
(1971).
Second, respondent must show that
the taxpayer intended to evade taxes by
conduct intended to conceal, mislead, or
otherwise prevent tax collection. Petzholdt
at 699. Stoltzfus v. United States, 398 F.2d
1002,
1005
(3d
Cir.
1968);
Parks
v.
Commissioner,
supra
at
661;
Rowlee
v.
Commissioner, 80 T.C. 1111, 1123 (1983).
T.C. Mem. Op. at 55.

Yet the tax court seemed to enable the

Commissioner to surmount this steep burden of proof by relying on
the facts deemed to be true. The court wrote:
On February 24, 1992, the Court imposed
sanctions on petitioners because Jeanette
Spear violated an order of the Court by
unreasonably refusing to testify at trial.
The Court ordered that respondent is deemed
to have made a prima facie showing that the
facts in paragraph seven of the amended
answer
(paragraph
7)
are
established.
Petitioners did not convince us that any of
the statements of facts in paragraph 7 are
wrong.
As discussed below, we conclude the
facts stated in paragraph 7 and the entire
record in this case clearly and convincingly
show that Leon and Jeanette Spear are liable
for fraud for each year in issue.
T.C. Mem. Op. at 55-56.
Despite these indications that the tax court switched
the burden of proof as well as the burden of production, there
are many other places in the opinion that make it appear that the
tax court found sufficient evidence of net worth and of fraud
without relying on the deemed facts.

Nonetheless, because we are

unsure whether the court relied on these facts and shifted the
burden of proof, and because the consequences to the taxpayers
are so significant, we must assume that the court did rely on
these

facts.

We

will

thus

treat

the

sanction

as

one

that

essentially shifted the burden of proof (and production) on net
worth and on fraud.
We note that shifting the burden of proof on the fraud
counts would be an even more severe sanction here than it would
be ordinarily because the tax court relied on taxpayers' fraud to
reject their statute of limitations defense.
at 62.

See T.C. Mem. Op.

Fraud will defeat a statute of limitations defense, Sec.

6501(c)(1), and if taxpayers had prevailed on the fraud count,
they may well have had a valid statute of limitations defense.1
See T.C. Mem. Op. at 62-63.

In sum, the sanction in this case

was quite significant and may well have controlled the outcome.

II.
A.

DISCUSSION

The Applicable Sanctions Standard

T.C. Rule 104(c) as quoted in Gerling Intern. Ins. Co.
v. C.I.R., 839 F.2d 131, 136 n.7 (3d Cir. 1988), provides in
pertinent part that:
"If a party. . . fails to obey an order made
by the court . . . the Court may make such
orders as to the failure as are just and
among others the following:
(1) An order that the matters regarding
which the order was made or any other
designated facts shall be taken to be
1

fraud.

The Tax Court did not reach this issue because it found

established for the purposes of the case in
accordance with the claim of the party
obtaining the order.
The rule is quite similar to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2), and we
construe them in pari materia.

We review the sanction of deeming

facts to be true under an abuse of discretion standard.

See Ins.

Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie Des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694, 707,
102 S. Ct. 2099, 2107 (1982); Ali v. Sims, 788 F.2d 954, 957 (3d
Cir. 1986).
In the context of discovery abuse, the Supreme Court
has provided guidance on use of the sanction of deeming facts to
be established.

In Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 707, 102

S. Ct. at 2107, the Court explained that
Rule 37(b)(2) contains two standards -- one
general and one specific -- that limit a
district court's discretion.
First, any
sanction must be `just'; second, the sanction
must
be
specifically
related
to
the
particular `claim' which was at issue in the
order to provide discovery.
In that case the Court held that the district court had not
abused

its

discretion

in

deeming

facts

establishing

personal

jurisdiction to be true absent proof to the contrary, because
defendants had repeatedly agreed to comply with discovery orders
and then failed to do so despite warnings that sanctions would
result.

Ins. Corp. of Ireland at 707-09, 102 S. Ct. at 2107.

The Court held that the second requirement, that the sanction be
related to the claim at issue, was met because the sanctions took
as established facts that plaintiff was seeking to prove through
discovery.

This

court

has

not

elaborated

Insurance Corp. of Ireland standard.
where

a

district

court

on

or

applied

the

In Ali, supra, we held that

sanctioned

defendants

by

deeming

allegations in plaintiff's complaint to be admitted and granted
summary judgment for plaintiff, the ruling was equivalent to a
default judgment and thus required application of the standards
we had set for issuing a sanction of dismissal.
957.

See 788 F.2d at

More specifically, we held in Ali that, under the factors

we had articulated in Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.,
747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984), the sanctions constituted an abuse
of discretion.
district

In Poulis we had explained that our review of a

court's

dismissal

with

prejudice

"is

guided

by

the

manner in which the trial court balanced [six] factors . . . and
whether the record supports its findings."
868.

Poulis, 747 F.2d at

The six factors are:
(1) the extent of the party's personal
responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the
adversary caused by the failure to meet
scheduling orders and respond to discovery;
(3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether
the conduct of the party or the attorney was
willful
or
in
bad
faith;
(5)
the
effectiveness
of
sanctions
other
than
dismissal which entails an analysis of
and
(6)
the
alternative
sanctions;
meritoriousness of the claim or defense.

Id.
In Ali we applied these factors to reverse a sanction
deeming certain facts to be true.

We held that, even if there

was inexcusable delay by the defendants in that case, there was
no bad faith, no history of dilatoriness, little prejudice from

the

delay

that

was

probably available.

caused,

and

less

severe

sanctions

were

Under those circumstances, sanctions that

were equivalent to dismissal constituted an abuse of discretion.
Id. at 957-58.

We explained that, "[i]n Poulis, we established

the strong presumption against sanctions that decide the issues
of a case."

Id. at 958.2

Here, unlike in Ali, the tax court's sanction did not
end the case.

At most the tax court deemed certain key facts

admitted and reversed the burden of proof.

While this is a

severe sanction, it is not the same as deeming allegations in a
complaint to be admitted or granting a default judgment.

In

Chilcutt v. United States, 4 F.3d 1313 (5th Cir. 1993), the Fifth
Circuit considered the standards for imposing a similar sanction
(of deeming prima facie elements of the plaintiffs' liability
claim

to

be

established).

The

court

held

that,

although

a

court's decision to deem certain facts established may sometimes
be equivalent to a default judgment, it was not equivalent where
the sanctioned party (the government) was allowed to present its
2

We have reviewed sanctions deeming facts to be
established on only two other occasions, and in neither did we
establish standards for determining whether the trial court
abused its discretion.
In Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d
987, 998 (3d Cir. 1951), we held that where the government
continued to refuse to produce documents based on a claim of
privilege that had been overruled, the court was authorized by
Rule 37 to deem the facts sought to be proved by the documents to
be admitted -- but we did not consider whether the court had
abused its discretion in applying such a sanction.
And in
Gerling we held that a similar sanction was illegitimate because
there had not been any discovery abuse -- thus, there was no
question whether the court had abused its discretion in imposing
sanctions for discovery abuse. See Gerling, 839 F.2d at 139.

case in chief and could have prevailed if it had established its
contentions by a preponderance of the evidence.
n.18.

Id. at 1320 &

Thus, instead of imposing the sanction under the standards

appropriate for a dismissal, the court applied the two standards
of Insurance Corp. of Ireland (the requirement of "justness" and
the requirement that the sanction be related to the particular
claim at issue in the order to provide discovery) -- "along with
a third -- that the sanction meet the Rule 37 goals of punishing
the party which has obstructed discovery and deterring others who
would otherwise be inclined to pursue similar behavior."

Id. at

1321.
Because the sanction was not equivalent to default, for
which a prerequisite under Fifth Circuit law is flagrant and
willful disregard, the court suggested, in what it admitted to be
dicta, that flagrant and willful disregard was not necessary.
Id. at 1322 n.23.

On the facts of the case, the Chilcutt court

upheld the sanction.

It stated that, where the district court

had warned the government that it would issue sanctions and the
government

had

repeatedly

promised

to

be

forthcoming,

the

plaintiffs had a colorable claim, and the evidence the government
had hidden was relevant to the plaintiff's case, the sanction was
just, related to the claim sought to be proved, and was necessary
to compensate for non-compliance and to deter future violations.
As for other considerations, the government's conduct was willful
and was not solely the fault of its attorney.

Id. at 1321-25.

We agree with the Chilcutt court that cases on the
sanction of dismissal are not automatically applicable to the

sanction

of

deeming

certain

facts

to

be

established.

Nonetheless, the Poulis factors are relevant to evaluating such a
sanction.

This

is

clear

from

the

fact

that,

in

evaluating

whether a district court has properly exercised its discretion in
imposing the sanction of exclusion of testimony, a sanction less
harsh than dismissal and probably similar to shifting the burden
of proof, we consider factors similar to those in Poulis.

See

Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Ass'n, 559 F.2d 894 (3d
Cir. 1977). We consider:
(1) the prejudice or surprise in fact of the
party against whom the excluded witnesses
would have testified, (2) the ability of that
party to cure the prejudice, (3) the extent
to which waiver of the rule against calling
unlisted witnesses would disrupt the orderly
and efficient trial of the case or of other
cases in the court, and (4) bad faith or
willfulness in failing to comply with the
district court's order.
Id.

Meyers and Poulis supply the sources of the standard we

adopt here.
Comparing the Meyers factors with Poulis, Factor 4 goes
to a party's culpability as do factors 1, 3, and 4 of the Poulis
factors.

See supra at 16.

does factor 2 of Poulis.

Factors 1 and 2 go to prejudice as
Factor 2 also goes to the ability to

correct the problem with action less harsh than the sanction
being considered as does factor 5 in Poulis.
the

ultimate

Poulis

calculus

is

a

Moreover, just as

balancing,

we

think

that

balancing similar factors is appropriate in assessing a sanction
of deeming established certain facts.

We apply a sliding scale -

- the harsher the sanction being imposed, the more the balance

will have to be against the party being sanctioned to justify the
sanction.

See

National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey

Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643, 96 S. Ct. 2778, 2781 (1976)
(dismissed);

Society

Internationale

Pour

Parcipations

Industrielles et Commerciales v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 212, 78 S.
Ct. 1087, 1096 (1958) (dismissal); Donnelly v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp.,677 F.2d 339, 342-43 )3d Cir. 1982) (dismissal);
Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Ass'n, 559 F.2d 894 (3d
Cir. 1977) (exclusion of critical evidence).
This approach is consistent with the Fifth Circuit's
opinion in Chilcutt.
dismissal

cases

Although the Chilcutt court held that the

were

not

on

point

and

that

the

test

from

Insurance Corp. of Ireland applied, the court referenced all of
the factors we consider in dismissal cases.
culpability

of

the

sanctioned

party

It considered the

including

whether

the

violation was solely the fault of the attorney or was also the
fault

of

the

sanctions.

client,

and

the

effectiveness

of

alternative

And while the court stated that willfulness was not

required to impose a sanction of deeming facts proved (thus,
incorporating our sliding scale theory of the appropriateness of
sanctions), it also implied that willfulness was relevant.

It

stated that "of course, the flagrancy of a party's behavior must
be

directly

imposed."

3

proportionate

to

the

severity

of

the

sanction

Chilcutt at 1322 n.23.3

. Although the Chilcutt court also considered the role of
the sanction in deterring future abuses, we need not consider
that factor here since a deterrence analysis clearly does not fit

This approach is also consistent with Insurance Corp.
of

Ireland

itself.

The

standard

articulated

there,

that

a

sanction must be 1) just and 2) specifically related to the
particular `claim' which was at issue, was essentially a general
standard for all Rule 37 sanctions.

Thus, like our opinion here,

our opinions in Poulis and Meyers had to be consistent with
Insurance

Corp.

of

Ireland

because

they

involved

Rule

37

sanctions.

They were consistent with it because they were an

elaboration

of

the

meaning

of

"just"

and

"related

to

the

particular claim" in particular contexts.
In

sum,

in

reviewing

a

trial

court

order

deeming

evidence admitted as a sanction for litigation misconduct, we
will engage in a weighing and balancing exercise in which we
consider: 1) culpability (including willfulness and bad faith,
and whether the client was responsible or solely the attorney);
2) prejudice; and 3) whether lesser sanctions would have been
effective.

In making the actual balancing we utilize a sliding

scale, so that bad faith, for example will have to be quite high
to tip the balance if other factors strongly favor the taxpayers.
We view this exercise to be a transliteration of the Insurance
Corp. of Ireland standard in that the prejudice consideration
subsumes the specific relatedness requirement, all of the factors
of which essentially elaborate on "justness."

the unusual facts of this case. See our discussion of taxpayer's
alleged bad faith infra at p. 24-30.

B.

Application of the Standard
1)

The Need to Show Bad Faith or Willfulness.

In the jurisprudence of dismissal, willfulness or bad
faith is almost always required in order for dismissal to be
within

the

proper

scope

of

the

court's

discretion.

In

the

particular cases before it, the Supreme Court, at a minimum, has
required

some

sort

of

fault

for

dismissal

to

be

allowable.

Compare Societe Internationale Pour Parcipations Industrielles et
Commerciales v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 212, 78 S. Ct. 1087, 1096
(1958) (where party could not comply with discovery order due to
Swiss law, dismissal was inappropriate.

It was "due to inability

and not to willfulness, bad faith, or any fault of petitioner.")
with National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc.,
427 U.S. 639, 643, 96 S. Ct. 2778, 2781 (1976) ("[D]ismissal was
appropriate in this case by reason of respondents' `flagrant bad
faith'

and

their

counsel's

`flagrant

disregard'

of

their

responsibilities.").
Some courts have held that willfulness or bad faith is
always required before dismissal is an acceptable sanction.

See

Ford v. Fogarty Van Lines, Inc., 780 F.2d 1582, 1583 (11th Cir.
1986) ("Absent a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by
the plaintiff, the trial court's discretion is limited to the
application of lesser sanctions [than dismissal]."); Wilson v.
Volkswagen

of

America,

Inc.,

561

F.2d

494

(4th

Cir.

1977);

Telectron, Inc. v. Overhead Door Corp., 116 F.R.D. 107, 131 (S.D.
Fla. 1987). But see United States v. Sumitomo Marine & Fire Ins.,
Co., 617 F.2d 1365, 1369 (9th Cir. 1980) (although government did

not exhibit bad faith, dismissal was necessary to deter flagrant
disobedience that resulted from understaffing).
Although we have held that dismissals are an extreme
sanction reserved for cases comparable to National Hockey League
where there was flagrant bad faith, see Poulis, 747 F.2d 863,
867-68, we have sometimes upheld a court's sanction of dismissal
even when there was no willfulness or bad faith.

See Poulis, 747

F.2d at 868-70; cf. Hicks v. Feeney, 850 F.2d 152, 156 (3d Cir.
1988) (not all Poulis factors have to be present for dismissal).
Nonetheless,

we

generally

willfulness and bad faith.

have

not

upheld

dismissal

absent

See Donnelly v. Johns-Manville Sales

Corp., 677 F.2d 339, 342-43 (3d Cir. 1982) (dismissal was an
abuse of discretion where there was delay in obtaining local
counsel but it was due to failure to move with dispatch rather
than to bad faith, where the delay caused little prejudice to the
defendant,

and

where

alternative sanction).

the

district

court

did

not

consider

an

Even with respect to the less extreme

sanction of exclusion of evidence, we have held that with respect
to critical evidence, "the exclusion of critical evidence is an
`extreme' sanction, not normally to be imposed absent a showing
of willful deception or `flagrant disregard' of a court order by
the proponent of the evidence."

Meyers at 905 (quoting Dudley v.

South Jersey Metal, Inc., 555 F.2d 96, 99 (3d Cir. 1977)).
Although, like the Chilcutt court, we do not have to
decide the issue, we assume that, when the sanction of deeming
facts to be true is not the equivalent of dismissal, willfulness
and bad faith are not prerequisites for imposing that sanction.

When a party does not provide information to another party to
which that party is entitled, a court is certainly permitted to
"even out" the proceedings by shifting the burden of proof in a
fair

way

even

in

the

absence

of

bad

faith.

Moreover,

in

Insurance Corp. of Ireland, the Supreme Court upheld a sanction
of deeming facts to be established, even though the court had
made

no

explicit

finding

of

bad

faith,

finding

repeated

violations of discovery orders to constitute sufficient fault to
justify the sanction.
Nonetheless, the presence of willfulness and bad faith
certainly enhances the case for sanctions.

Shifting the burden

of proof, as the tax court seems to have done here when it deemed
certain facts to be established, is a fairly extreme sanction.
It significantly changes the likely outcome at trial.

In the

absence of willfulness or bad faith, other factors would have to
weigh strongly in the favor of such a severe sanction to justify
it.

The

2)

Did Jeanette's Conduct Constitute Bad Faith?

tax

court's

taxpayers

was

Jeanette

was

deliberately attempting to avoid her testimonial duties.

The

essentially

finding

of

bottomed

bad

faith

on

was

decision
its

to

sanction

finding

grounded

upon

that

the

following:

1)

Jeanette's illness and hospitalizations correlated with the time
of her scheduled testimony; 2) the lack of evidence of illness at
other times; 3)

the taxpayers' agreement to a deposition after

the court ordered a mental and physical examination of Jeanette,

while initially maintaining that Jeanette could not be deposed;
4) Jeanette's competent answer to questions at her deposition,
demonstrating a significant knowledge of the case;
failure

to

timely

inform

the

court

that

5) taxpayers

Jeanette

could

not

testify (twice) or see a psychiatrist (once); and 6) taxpayers
failure to inform the court that Jeanette had been released from
the hospital until after the trial was over.

T.C. Mem. Op. at

27-29.
A

different

explanation

exists,

however,

for

the

correlation between the severity of Jeanette's illness and the
imminence of court appearances (and the resultant tardiness of
taxpayers informing the court that Jeanette could not testify)
from the one that posits that the alleged illness was a tactic to
avoid testifying.

A legitimate, medically grounded connection

may have existed between Jeanette's illness and the imminence of
court appearances.
believe

that

the

In order to disbelieve this explanation (and
correlation

demonstrated

that

Jeanette

was

making up the illness to avoid court appearances), the tax court
had to entirely discredit the evaluation of several physicians.
Dr.

Durkin,

a

board-certified

psychiatrist

and

apparently neutral witness who had never treated Jeanette prior
to her admittance to the emergency room at Nazareth hospital,
consistently

diagnosed

Jeanette

as

having

a

major

depressive

disorder, and did so upon Jeanette's admission to the hospital
shortly before trial. He also maintained that this disorder was
related

to

her

difficulties

with

the

IRS,

and

he

stated

on

several occasions between November, 1991 and August, 1992, that

testifying would pose a serious threat to Jeanette's health.
JA15-JA18.

Dr. Durkin reached this conclusion based on several

examinations of Jeanette, including examinations during a time
when trial was not imminent.

Moreover, he based his opinion not

only on his own evaluation but on that of a neurologist and a
recreational therapist who had examined Jeanette during her first
hospitalization.
Dr.
affidavit

of

Durkin's
Dr.

evaluation

Rubin,

who

also

was

corroborated

concluded

illness was related to the legal proceedings.

by

the

that

Jeanette's

JA11.

He stated

that she attributed her husband's death to those proceedings and
feared

dying

herself

as

a

result

of

them.

He

added

testifying would be psychologically devastating to her.
tax

court,

these

physicians

were

certainly

that

Like the

aware

of

the

possibility that Jeanette was feigning illness in order to avoid
testifying, and yet they opined to the contrary.

The only doctor

who concluded that Jeanette was capable of testifying did so
before her first hospitalization.4
The tax court's other justifications for its findings
also do not demonstrate bad faith.

The fact that taxpayers

eventually agreed to allow Jeanette to be deposed does not show
that their concern with her appearance at court proceedings was
not

genuine.

Taxpayers

were

faced

with

a

choice

of

having

Jeanette submit to a mental and physical examination, having her

4

Dr. Sol B. Barenbaum, a psychologist chosen
Commissioner, examined Jeanette on November 2, 1990.

by

the

deposed, or facing a significant possibility of sanctions.

Their

reluctant agreement to a deposition does not demonstrate a lack
of concern that such a deposition would affect Jeanette's health.
We

have

viewed

describe infra at 32.

the

videotape

deposition

which

we

Although Jeanette broke down and cried and

had to be soothed on several occasions, and seemed confused as to
questions

at

others,

she

basically

gave

a

lucid

deposition

without emotional breakdown, a factor that, as the tax court
noted, would seem to undermine the doctors' conclusions that
testifying would be emotionally devastating to her.5
not physicians.

But we are

The deposition revealed Jeanette to be quite

emotionally upset, and we cannot say with assurance that the fact
that she was able to testify on one occasion automatically means
that she could always do so.
Dr. Durkin continued to believe after this deposition
(at the time of her second hospitalization) that Jeanette was
suffering from a major depressive order.

And he reported that

upon hospitalization "she indicated that she became quite anxious
and quite upset when she discovered that the Internal Revenue
Service wished her to be deposed for another hour period of time.
She add[ed], `[t]hey have all that they can possibly get from me,
what else are they looking for.'"

JA 232.

Thus, Jeanette's fear

of the IRS may have escalated after the videotaped deposition.

5

On the other hand, if Jeanette gave a full and lucid
deposition, that undermines the IRS's position that it was
prejudiced by her failure to appear at trial. See infra at 3234.

Moreover, although the IRS offered to make the conditions during
Jeanette's

trial

testimony

similar

to

those

during

her

deposition, the judge's presence at trial would have added an
intimidating factor not present during the earlier deposition.
Finally, defendants' failure to inform the tax court
of Jeanette's release from the hospital, while improper, does not
show that taxpayers were deliberately creating an excuse to avoid
having Jeanette testify.
advice,

Jeanette was discharged against medical

JA 225, and if taxpayers had really been attempting to

deceive the court, they would have had Jeanette stay in the
hospital until the conclusion of the trial.
Thus, in the face of contrary opinions by two experts
who had significant opportunity to examine Jeanette, the tax
court's explanation for its finding that Jeanette's "refusal to
testify was a manipulation, and not a bona fide response to
medical problems," JA 29, was extremely thin.

Moreover, it seems

extremely unlikely that Jeanette was attempting to manipulate the
trial process given that she had very little to gain by doing so
-- there is little reason to believe that her testimony would
have substantially aided the Commissioner; rather, it might have
significantly hurt the Commissioner.

For example, based on our

viewing of the deposition, we find Jeanette's testimony as to the
$380,000 cash hoard quite straightforward, and it seems to be
credible.

Finally, we note that even if Jeanette initially went

to the hospital partly as an attempt to avoid testifying and
helping the Commissioner, after receiving medical advice, she had
every reason to worry about testifying.

Similarly, Jeanette's co-defendants, the representative
of

the

children,

Estate
had

of

Leon

every

Spear

reason

and

to

testifying would have on her.

ultimately

worry

about

of

the

Jeanette's
effect

that

Thus, it is highly unlikely that

taxpayers' refusal to allow Jeanette to testify was based solely
on an attempt to manipulate the trial process and did not reflect
significant concern for her health.

Compounding the problem is

the fact that the tax court declined to hold a hearing on the
issue because such a hearing would allegedly have disrupted the
trial schedule.

Yet taxpayers offered to produce Dr. Durkin at

the time when this would not disrupt the trial.

Especially in

the absence of a hearing at which the tax court could ask Dr.
Durkin why he was sure that Jeanette was not making up her
illness or at least its severity, the tax court's finding of bad
faith is seriously problematic.
We acknowledge that taxpayer was not prevented from
complying with the court's order due to an external constraint.
Even

if

Jeanette

truly

feared

becoming

more

sick

if

she

testified, she still was physically capable of testifying and
consciously

chose

not

compliance was willful.

to

do

so.

In

this

sense,

her

non-

Moreover, it was a choice that she made

rather than a choice her attorney made.

Nonetheless, we think

that Jeanette's level of culpability was not high, given that we
have found that her fears of testifying were legitimate.6
6

The tax court may also have based its decision to
sanction the defendants on the fact that Jeanette did not go
through with the second court ordered physical and mental
examination, in the fall of 1991. (T.C. Mem. Op. at 34-35). But

We review the tax court's finding of bad faith and
wilfulness

deferentially,

i.e.,

for

clear

error.

See

Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 290-91 (1960); B.B,
Rider Corp. v. Commissioner, 725 F.2d 945, 948 (3d Cir. 1984);
DeCavalcante v. Commissioner, 620 F.2d 23, 26 (3d Cir. 1980).

A

finding is clearly erroneous when although there is evidence to
support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.
(1948).

United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395

While we understand the tax court's annoyance with Mrs.

Spear, for the reasons we have elaborated on at such length, we
are left with such a firm conviction here.

But even if the

problematic bad faith finding survives because of deferential
review (and if it did, it would be only by a small margin), the
result would be the same because, under the sliding scale, the
bad faith will have to be quite high to tip the balance in favor
of the IRS in view of the fact that the other factors in the
Insurance Corp. of Ireland-based test we apply strongly favor the
taxpayer, see infra at 32-35, and it is not.

3)

The Need to Show Prejudice

the IRS only asked for this examination when Jeanette refused to
submit to a videotaped deposition.
After Jeanette did submit,
the IRS withdrew its motion for sanctions. Thus, the Spears had
little reason to believe that she was still required to submit to
such an examination, and hence meaning her refusal to do so
cannot reasonably be deemed willful and in bad faith.

In Insurance Corp. of Ireland, the Court held that "the
sanction must be specifically related to the particular `claim'
which was at issue in the order to provide discovery." 456 U.S.
at 707, 102 S. Ct. at 2107.
not

inherently

bar

It may be that this requirement does

sanctions

where

there

is

no

prejudice.

Arguably a sanction may be considered to be "specifically related
to the particular `claim'" at issue in the discovery order even
when there is little indication that the discovery would have
produced useful information.
able

to

provide

gain

a

strategic

information

sanctions

because

it
the

is

A party should certainly not be

advantage

at

trial

required

to

provide

other

side

cannot

by

refusing
and

to

avoiding

demonstrate

the

importance of this information.
Nonetheless,

the

basic

thrust

of

the

Supreme

Court

jurisprudence is that sanctions that effect the outcome of the
trial

should

only

be

imposed

in

order

to

compensate

for

violations that may plausibly be thought likely to affect the
outcome of the trial.

See Wilson v. Volkswagen of America,

Inc., 561 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1977) ("Even in those cases where it
may be found that failure to produce results in the discovering
party's case being jeopardized or prejudiced, it is the normal
rule that the sanction must be no more severe than is necessary
to prevent prejudice to the movant." (quotations omitted)).7
7

And

Cf. Betz v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 816, 823 (1988) (where
government delay in filing a brief caused no prejudice, the court
would not deem certain facts true as a sanction); Meyers v.
Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Ass'n, 559 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1977)
(reversing the exclusion of the witnesses' testimony where the
failure to include the witnesses in the pretrial memoranda was

so we conclude that the imposition of any sanction that affects
the likely outcome of a trial requires that the party sanctioned
have gained some advantage from his or her disobedience of a
court order.

In other words, the party that gains from the

sanction

have

must

been

at

least

arguably

prejudiced

by the

misconduct of the other side.
4) Was There Prejudice?
While

the

deposition

was

palpably

an

emotional

experience for Jeanette, and she broke down and cried several
times, her deposition was lucid and informative.

As we viewed

the deposition, she possessed and was able to and did relate, in
response to questions, a great deal of information about the
affairs of the parking lot business.

There were also many things

not a result of bad faith but of late discovery of the witnesses,
the plaintiff informed the defendant of the discovery of the
witnesses three weeks before trial thus minimizing prejudice, and
the possibility existed of postponing the trial for a few days,
conducting further discovery and taxing the costs to the
plaintiff); De Marines v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 580 F.2d
1193, 1202 (3d Cir. 1978) (reversing the exclusion of a witness'
testimony where there was only a slight deviation from pre-trial
notice requirements, and admitting the witness was likely to
cause only slight prejudice to the defendants, who were already
aware of the basic substance of the witness' testimony); United
States v. Kincaid, 712 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1983) ("Courts
consistently have refused to impose sanctions when the government
has destroyed evidence but the destruction did not prejudice the
defendants."); Faberge, Inc. v. Saxony Products, Inc., 605 F.2d
426, 429
(9th Cir. 1979) (declining to award sanctions under
Rule 56(g) which allows sanctions for affidavits submitted in bad
faith, because no court had relied on the affidavit submitted);
but cf. National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc.,
427 U.S. 639, 643, 96 S. Ct. 2778, 2781 (1976) (dismissal must be
available "not merely to penalize those whose conduct may be
deemed to warrant such a sanction, but to deter those who might
be tempted to such conduct in the absence of such a deterrent. .
. .").

that she did not know or remember, but it seems unlikely that,
given that the events happened so many years ago, she would
recall additional details at trial.

While Jeanette was quite

deliberate, and sometimes stated that she did not understand what
appeared to be simple questions (which were then repeated and
answered), she was direct and composed.

She was apparently not

feeling well physically (as well as emotionally), but, given the
length of the deposition and the amount of detail covered, it is
difficult to see how anything more would be forthcoming at a
trial.
In our view, there was no prejudice to the IRS from
Jeanette's failure to testify.

While the IRS stresses the need

to obtain the truth, the fact is that the court received Mrs.
Spear's 257-page (videotaped) deposition that we have described.
What more did it need?

To repeat, having viewed the videotape,

we cannot conceive what more the IRS could have adduced at trial.
Moreover, Jeanette's testimony was favorable to the taxpayers
rather than the government; thus, the only thing the government
had a reasonable chance of gaining from her testimony was a hope
to trip her up à la Perry Mason and diminish the credibility of
taxpayers' evidence.

That rarely happens in the real world, and

the Commissioner already had been presented with a chance to
question Jeanette in a five hour deposition that occurred two
months

before

trial

during

which

defendants

had

very

few

objections to the questions posed by the Commissioner's counsel.
The

tax

court

thus

had

an

excellent

opportunity

to

Jeanette's credibility even without her appearance at trial.

judge

Moreover,

when

the

IRS

requested

the

videotaped

deposition, it did so in part because it was aware that Jeanette
might not be available for trial and it marked the transcript for
use at trial.

Thus, during the deposition, the IRS had every

incentive to ask all the questions it wanted to ask at trial.
The IRS did not explain what additional questions it had for
Jeanette that she had not already answered during the deposition.
The

IRS

argues

that

there

was

Jeanette was a "key witness in this case."

prejudice

because

While Jeanette was a

key witness, this does not explain why the IRS needed her live
testimony.

Although live testimony is generally preferable to

videotaped testimony, the absence of such testimony, even from a
key witness, is only minimally prejudicial when that witness is
adverse and when there is a videotaped deposition that can be
introduced in lieu of live testimony.

That videotaped deposition

testimony is a staple of modern case management in federal courts
is

too

well

established

to

require

citation.

And

yet,

as

taxpayers contend, "[e]ssentially, the IRS claims that it was
crucial to have Jeanette testify for a second time so that she
would not be believed."

(Appellant's Reply at 19).

But that, we

have noted, is no basis for a conclusion of prejudice.

5)

The

Balancing

Exercise.

In

view

of

the

foregoing discussion, the balancing exercise is not difficult.
We have concluded that the IRS incurred no prejudice, in view of
the availability of the videotaped deposition.

On the subject of

whether lesser sanctions would have been effective, this does not

seem to be a factor here.

Although a finding of bad faith may

not be strictly necessary to support sanctions, see Ins. Corp. of
Ireland, 456 U.S. at 707, 102 S. Ct. at 2107; Hammond Parking Co.
v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322, 350-51, 29 S. Ct. 370, 380 (1908);
Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Ass'n, 559 F.2d 894, 905
(3d Cir. 1977), the imposition of sanctions in the absence of bad
faith generally requires a strong showing of prejudice.

But

whatever rationale the tax court judge might have had, there
certainly were lesser sanctions than were employed here that
could have "sent the message."

Finally, we have concluded that

the tax court's finding that Jeanette's failure to appear for
trial was in bad faith is clearly erroneous, but that, even if
not,

it

was

sufficiently

marginal

that

it

would

have

been

outweighed by the other factors which strongly militated in favor
of the taxpayers' position.
result is the same.

Hence, on the sliding scale the

Accordingly, the sanction constituted an

abuse of discretion and must be set aside.

III.

CONCLUSION

We have concluded that the sanction imposed by the tax
court, of deeming admitted the facts that furnished the predicate
for use of the net worth method, and shifting the burden of proof
on

both

net

worth

and

fraud

from

the

IRS

to

the

taxpayer,

constituted an abuse of discretion and must be set aside.

We

will therefore vacate the decision of the tax court and remand
the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The court may, of course, elect to retry the case.

In that

event,

it

might

be

well

advised

to

rely

upon

Jeanette's

videotaped deposition in lieu of her testimony, although perhaps
her emotional state is now better.

On the other hand, the court

may simply prefer to decide the case on the basis of the existing
record, but absent the "deeming" and its consequences which we
have declared invalid.8

8

.
At all events, the tax court will have to address a
number of interesting and difficult questions pertaining to the
net worth method and its application to this case, which we have
not had to reach in view of our disposition.

